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Finding the Middle Ground: Acuna v.
Turkish and the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s Reaffirmation of a Doctor’s Role
Under the Doctrine of Informed
Consent in the Digital Age
Allyson M. Rucinski*
“Google it!” I have heard these words uttered countless
times by people looking to obtain information about everything
from a TV show, a historical event, or even a medical condition.
And while the Internet itself is no longer a novel concept, the
impact it is having on the everyday patient is ever evolving.
With information readily available at the touch of a button, people are constantly using the Internet to read about their medical conditions, diagnose their symptoms, discover new medical
breakthroughs, and even obtain a list of potential medications.
The days of a doctor being a patient’s primary source for medical information are gone. Today the Internet, in connection
with direct-to-consumer advertising, has effectively transformed the “reasonable patient” into an “informed consumer.”
This new take on the reasonable patient is a far cry from its
early twentieth century counterpart that was in existence during the development of the doctrine of informed consent.1 Historically, the medical community considered patients ignorant
of medicine, and accordingly, rested all medical decision-making authority with the doctor.2 When the courts began to recognize a patient’s right to self-determination, however, the issue
of who decides what medical treatment a patient should un* Allyson M. Rucinski received her B.A. in Political Science from The College
of New Jersey in 2001, and received her J.D. from Pace University School of Law
in 2009. The author would like to thank her parents and sisters for their overwhelming support and encouragement in not only writing this Note, but all of her
law school endeavors.
1. See Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the CommonLaw Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 522 (1998).
2. Id. at 509-10.
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dergo was shifted to the patient.3 In order to assist patients in
making these decisions, the doctrine of informed consent imposed a duty upon doctors to disclose medical treatment information to their patients prior to obtaining consent.4 Over the
years, different standards developed for judging the level of disclosure required for informed consent—from that of a reasonable medical practitioner, to that of a reasonable patient.5 In
addition, a body of law developed in the aftermath of Roe v.
Wade6 that focused on the specific informed consent requirements for a woman seeking an abortion.7 Regardless of whether
a doctor is seeking a patient’s consent to remove a tumor or to
have an abortion, the underlying public policy reasons behind
the doctrine of informed consent remain the same today—“to
ensure that patients have sufficient facts for making health
care decisions.”8
But if the purpose behind the doctrine of informed consent
is to ensure that patients make educated health care decisions,
what is the role of the doctor if the “reasonable patient” is now
an “informed consumer”? For general medical procedures,
many doctors have resorted to computer generated printouts,
prepackaged pharmaceutical marketing pamphlets, and website referrals to satisfy the bare minimum duty under the doctrine of informed consent. Conversely, some states have taken
it upon themselves to over-legislate in the area of abortion by
requiring doctors to make excessive disclosures that are arguably moral, philosophical, or religious in nature. There needs to
be a middle ground between these two extremes. The New
Jersey Supreme Court provides guidance as to what this middle
ground should be in its decision in Acuna v. Turkish.9
In Acuna v. Turkish, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
asked to decide what a doctor is—and is not—required to dis3. See Paul A. Lombardo, Phantom Tumors and Hysterical Women: Revising
our View of the Schloendorff Case, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 791, 791 (2005).
4. See Northern, supra note 1, at 512-16 (discussing the different disclosure
duties placed on doctors under various forms of the informed consent doctrine).
5. Id. at 516.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Linda P. McKenzie, Federally Mandated Informed Consent: Has Government Gone Too Far?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 267, 296-97 (2007).
8. Id. at 272.
9. 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007).
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close to a patient seeking an abortion.10 The court reaffirmed
that the common law doctrine of informed consent requires a
doctor to only disclose material medical information, and it declined to impose a duty on physicians to inform a pregnant patient that an embryo is an existing, living, human being, or that
abortion results in the killing of an irreplaceable existing
human life.11 The court also recognized that now, more than
ever, with the wealth of information, studies, and knowledge
readily available to patients, a doctor is not required to provide
a patient with all the possible information available—only the
information that is medically material.12 Although the court
limited what a doctor is required to disclose, it in no way diminished a doctor’s role. Rather, the court’s decision implicitly acknowledged that the informed consumer has created a greater
need for the doctor to reemerge as a medical expert. This Note
first discusses the origins of the doctrine of informed consent
and the evolution of the two standards used today to determine
the necessary level of disclosure: the reasonable medical practitioner and the reasonable patient. In addition, this Note addresses how the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe
v. Wade has substantially altered the role of the doctrine of informed consent in the area of abortion by expanding and, in
many cases, legislating the specific disclosures that must be
made by a doctor before performing an abortion. The second
part of this Note discusses the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Acuna v. Turkish and the reasoning employed by the
court in finding that a doctor is only required to disclose medically material information. Finally, the last section of this Note
argues that in the context of an abortion case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s decision in Acuna provides guidance as to the
10. Under New Jersey’s common law doctrine of informed consent “a physician has a legal duty to disclose to the patient all medical information that a reasonably prudent patient would find material before deciding whether to undergo a
medical procedure.” Id. at 425 (citing Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J.
1988)). See discussion infra Part II (explaining in detail the doctrine of informed
consent).
11. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 427-28. See also Rothman, 540 A.2d at 508 (“A risk
would be deemed ‘material’ when a reasonable patient, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be ‘likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks’ in deciding whether to forego the proposed
therapy or to submit to it.”) (internal citations omitted).
12. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 427-28.
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level of disclosure a doctor in the digital age must provide under
the doctrine of informed consent to a “reasonable patient”
turned “informed consumer.”
I. The Doctrine of Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent derives from the principle
that a patient has a right to self-determination—to either permit or refuse medical treatment.13 Under these auspices, informed consent imposes a two-prong duty on doctors: (1) a duty
to disclose information pertaining to treatment, and (2) a duty
to obtain a patient’s consent prior to administering treatment.14
The goal of informed consent statutes is to “safeguard a patient’s physical well-being”15 by having doctors and patients
“share medical decision-making.”16 Although this information
exchange between a doctor and patient seems commonplace today, the recognition of patient autonomy that formed the basis
for informed consent within the doctor-patient relationship is
relatively new, developing during the twentieth century.17
A. Evolution of the Doctrine of Informed Consent
Historically, doctors simply dictated a course of treatment
to their patients.18 This paternalistic approach to medicine reflected the perception of the times that the average patient was
unable to understand medical science and only doctors possessed the knowledge and experience necessary to treat patients. Therefore, it was the doctors who alone made all of a
13. Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37
N.M. L. REV. 39, 41-42 (2007).
14. Id. at 43.
15. Northern, supra note 1, at 510.
16. Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from
Medical Consumerism and the Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability
Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 152 (1994).
17. Northern, supra note 1, at 509.
18. See id. at 509-10. Indeed, [u]ntil very recently, medical professionals interpreted the ethical injunction to work in the interest of patients to mean that
they should make decisions for patients. Physicians generally assumed that
medicine was primarily a science, that doctors were experts who would know better than patients what was in their interest, and that patients had neither the
interest in becoming involved in medical decision-making nor the ability to do so.
Doctors promoted benign paternalism. Rodwin, supra note 16, at 150-51.
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patient’s medical decisions.19 Prior to the twentieth century,
there was only limited disclosure as to the nature of the treatment, risks, or alternatives available to a patient.20 In fact,
what little was told to a patient was arguably not intended to
facilitate the patient’s process of making an educated decision
regarding a course of treatment, but rather to assist the doctor
in administering the treatment he had selected for the patient.21 It was not until the twentieth century that the torts of
battery and negligence were used to require doctors to give
greater disclosure to patients, and to also provide a remedy to
patients who did not receive adequate disclosure or who did not
consent to a treatment.22 The case of Schloendorff v. New York
Hospital23 is generally credited with establishing the idea of patient autonomy and a patient’s right to self-determination in relation to medical decisions.24 In Schloendorff, the patient
brought an action for battery against a doctor who failed to obtain her consent prior to performing surgery.25 In writing the
opinion for the court, Judge Cardozo stated: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body.”26 This statement by
Judge Cardozo is frequently referenced as establishing the origins of informed consent.27 During the mid-twentieth century,
courts shifted away from the tort of battery, to applying the doc19. Northern, supra note 1, at 509.
20. Julie Gantz, Note, State Statutory Preclusion of Wrongful Birth Relief: A
Troubling Re-Writing of a Woman’s Right to Choose and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 795, 799 (1997).
21. Northern, supra note 1, at 510. See also Gantz, supra note 20, at 799-800.
22. See Northern, supra note 1, at 510-11 (citing Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d
1093, 1104, reh’g denied, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960) (clarifying original decision)).
23. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In Schloendorff, a female patient brought a medical malpractice suit against her doctor for performing an unauthorized surgery.
See Lombardo, supra note 3, at 791. The doctor had found a tumor on the patient
and the patient consented to having the doctor examine the tumor while she was
under ether. Id. Instead of just examining the tumor, the doctor performed an
operation that caused her to suffer leg injuries and lose fingers due to gangrene.
Id.
24. Lombardo, supra note 3, at 791. See also Shelly S. Fraser, Note, Hospital
Liability: Drawing a Fine Line with Informed Consent in Today’s Evolving Health
Care Arena, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 253, 257 (2004).
25. Lombardo, supra note 3, at 793. See discussion of facts in Schloendorff,
supra note 23.
26. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
27. Lombardo, supra note 3, at 791.
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trine of negligence to actions where a doctor failed to inform the
patient of the material risks and benefits of a treatment or any
alternatives.28 In Natanson v. Kline, the court set forth a negligence approach to informed consent, by highlighting “that each
man is considered to be the master of his own body, and he may,
if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of
life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment[;] . . . the law
does not permit [a doctor] to substitute his own judgment for
that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.”29
The doctrine of informed consent ultimately developed to
protect a patient’s right to self-determination and to impose on
doctors a duty to disclose information pertaining to a patient’s
treatment prior to obtaining consent.30 For patients to bring an
action in negligence for lack of informed consent, they must
show that “(1) [the] ‘risk was inherent to the medical or surgical
procedure undertaken’ and (2) the ‘risk was material, in that it
could influence a reasonable person’s decision to consent to the
procedure.’”31 “A patient must also prove that a reasonable person would not have consented to the procedure if the material
risk had been disclosed and that the lack of informed consent is
the proximate cause of the injury.”32
Generally, valid and informed consent requires “capacity,
disclosure, and voluntariness.”33 As such, doctors are required
to convey information to patients in terms they can understand.34 Although capacity is traditionally a requirement of
valid consent, an exception exists for emergency situations
where a patient may lack the capacity to give such consent.35 In
addition, the voluntariness requirement is satisfied so long as a
patient’s decision is free from “force, coercion or manipula28. Northern, supra note 1, at 510. See also Rodwin, supra note 16, at 152.
29. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
30. Northern, supra note 1, at 510.
31. Fraser, supra note 24, at 258.
32. Id.
33. Grimm, supra note 13, at 40. For a patient to have capacity, she must be
able to “understand both the information presented and its relevance, and be able
to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decision.” Id. at 4041.
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id. at 42, 65.
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tion.”36 This includes when a patient voluntarily waives his or
her right to informed consent.37
The requirement that is most often a source of contention is
the proscribed level of disclosure. Typically, a doctor is required
to disclose to a patient all pertinent information relating to
medical or surgical treatment.38 Treatment encompasses “all
the steps taken to effect a cure of an injury or disease, including
examination and diagnoses as well as application of remedies.”39 Informed consent, however, is presumed in situations
that are “only diagnostic and are minimally invasive.”40 Some
medical professionals believe that a doctor’s obligation to disclose information to his patient is satisfied when he provides:
(1) A description of the recommended treatment or
procedure; (2) a description of the risks and benefits of
the recommended procedure, with special emphasis on
risks of death or serious bodily disability; (3) a description of the alternatives, including other treatments or
procedures, together with the risks and benefits of
these alternatives; (4) the likely results of no treatment; (5) the probability of success, and what the physician means by success; (6) the major problems
anticipated in recuperation, and the time period during which the patient will not be able to resume his or
her normal activities; and (7) any other information
generally provided to patients in this situation by
other qualified physicians.41

Conversely, there are cases where a doctor may not be required
to disclose all information to a patient under a therapeutic privilege,42 including cases where “disclosure may be harmful to the
patient.”43

36. Id. at 41.
37. Id. at 42, 65.
38. Id. at 40, 67.
39. Id. at 41.
40. Id. at 65-66. These include “situations such as drawing blood, taking a
temperature, or conducting routine physical exams.” Id. at 65.
41. Id. at 43-44.
42. Id. at 42.
43. Id. at 65.
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B. Different Standards under Informed Consent
Two primary standards have evolved to adjudge the appropriate level of disclosure required for informed consent: (1) the
reasonable medical practitioner standard, and (2) the reasonable patient standard. Initially, negligence actions based on lack
of informed consent were analyzed using the reasonable medical practitioner standard. This standard based the amount and
type of information a doctor must disclose on what a reasonable
medical practitioner would do under the same or similar circumstances.44 Under this approach, physicians breached their
duty when their disclosures fell below an acceptable standard
established by fellow physicians.45 Typically, a doctor had to
“disclose collateral hazards of proposed treatment, as well as alternative modalities of therapy.”46 This was the dominant standard used by courts until the seminal case of Canterbury v.
Spence47 in 1972.
The court in Canterbury v. Spence adopted a new standard
—the reasonable patient standard—for determining whether
adequate disclosure had been made.48 Under this objective
standard, a doctor must disclose “what a reasonable person
would find material to the decision to undergo treatment.”49 As
such, a doctor is not required to disclose all the risks of a particular treatment, just those that are material.50 “A risk is material when a reasonable patient, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding
whether to forgo the proposed therapy or to submit to it.”51 In
adopting this standard, the court recognized the inadequacies of
44. Northern, supra note 1, at 512.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Canterbury was not the first case to announce a patient standard, but it is the leading case on the matter. Heyward H.
Bouknight, III, Note, Between the Scalpel and the Lie: Comparing Theories of Physician Accountability for Misrepresentations of Experience and Competence, 60
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1524-25 (2003).
48. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87.
49. Bethany J. Spielman, Managed Care Regulation and the Physician-Advocate, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 713, 724 (1999).
50. Northern, supra note 1, at 516.
51. Id. at 515-16.
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a reasonable medical practitioner standard in achieving patient
autonomy.
In our view, the patient’s right of self-decision
shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. That
right can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent
choice. The scope of the physician’s communications
to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s
need, and that need is the information material to the
decision.52

Jurisdictions are split on which of the two standards to apply.53 The majority of jurisdictions that employ a reasonable
medical practitioner standard are also those that have statutorily regulated the level of disclosure required for informed
consent.54
C. Informed Consent and Abortion
In the case of Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme
Court recognized a right of personal privacy under the Constitution, which “encompass[ed] a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.”55 While the Court held that a woman has a right to an abortion, it also noted that this right is
not absolute.56 The right is subject to a certain amount of regulation by the states to advance their legitimate interests in “protecting maternal health,” “maintaining medical standards,” and
“protecting potential life.”57 States have used this language,
however, as an opportunity to regulate abortion in a manner
unlike any other medical procedure.58 Specifically, states have
attempted to increase the amount of information that a doctor
is required to disclose to a woman before she can consent to an
52. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.
53. Fraser, supra note 24, at 257.
54. Northern, supra note 1, at 512.
55. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
56. Id. at 154-55.
57. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey, and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process Anti-Discrimination Principle that Gives Constitutional Content to the “Undue Burden” Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control
Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 211, 222 (2001).
58. Id. at 246.
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abortion.59 Shortly after Roe v. Wade was decided, the Supreme
Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth60
saw the first attempt by the states to expand the doctrine of
informed consent in an abortion context. In Danforth, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Missouri abortion
statute that required a woman to certify her consent to an abortion procedure in writing.61 The statute provided that “a woman, prior to submitting to an abortion during the first 12
weeks of pregnancy, must certify in writing her consent to the
procedure and that her consent is informed and freely given and
is not the result of coercion.”62 The Court recognized that while
this requirement is unique to abortion, it is appropriate because
the decision to abort “is an important, and often a stressful one,
and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full
knowledge of its nature and consequences.”63
In 1980, two additional challenges to existing abortion laws
were presented to the courts. Each challenge sought to further
expand informed consent requirements by requiring a doctor to
give specific disclosures to patients seeking to obtain an abortion. The United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota in Leigh v. Olson64 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Charles v. Carey,65 applied the
principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Danforth. Each
court found certain provisions of the respective abortion laws to
be unconstitutional.66
59. Pennsylvania, in particular, has repeatedly attempted to enact statutory
disclosures that a doctor must make before being able to perform an abortion. See
the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions Concerning Reproductive Rights 1965-2007, Dec. 1, 2007,
www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/Courts-SCOTUS-Choice-Cases.pdf, for a
list of Supreme Court decisions concerning reproductive rights, including four
cases involving Pennsylvania statutes.
60. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
61. Id. at 58-60.
62. Id. at 65.
63. Id. at 66-67. The Court also noted that the only other Missouri statute
that required this type of consent for a general medical or surgical procedure was
for “persons committed to the Missouri State chest hospital . . . or to mental or
correctional institutions.” Id. at 66 n.6.
64. 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980).
65. 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
66. Leigh, 497 F. Supp. at 1352; Charles, 627 F.2d at 784.
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The district court in Leigh v. Olson found a North Dakota
statute, which, similar to Danforth, required a patient to certify
her consent to an abortion in writing, to be unconstitutional.
Specifically, the court took issue with the statutory requirement
that a doctor put forth specific information that is of questionable truth and validity.67 The disclosures at issue in the statute
required a doctor to inform a patient of:
c. The probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at the time the abortion is
to be performed.
d. The immediate and long-term physical dangers of
abortion, psychological trauma resulting from abortion, sterility and increases in the incidence of premature births, tubal pregnancies and stillbirths in
subsequent pregnancies, as compared to the dangers
in carrying the pregnancy to term.
...
f. Alternatives to abortion such as childbirth and
adoption and information concerning public and private agencies that will provide the woman with economic and other assistance and encouragement to
carry her child to term including, if the woman so requests, a list of the agencies and the services available
from each.68

The court ruled that these disclosures imposed a direct burden on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.69
Similarly, in Charles v. Carey, the Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975,
which also tried to expand the information requirements for
doctors treating patients seeking an abortion. This statute
made it a Class B misdemeanor if a doctor failed to inform a
patient at least 24-hours before a procedure of the medical risks
associated with that procedure; the probable gestational age of
the fetus; the availability of state materials that depicted the
different characteristics of a fetus at different gestational
stages; and that a fetus is capable of feeling pain, as well as
methods to control fetal pain.70 The court held that these re67.
68.
69.
70.

Leigh, 497 F. Supp. at 1345.
Id. at 1344 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(4) (1979)).
Id. at 1345-46.
Charles, 627 F.2d at 781-82.
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quirements posed an obstacle to a woman’s ability to obtain an
abortion and that the information regarding fetal pain was
“medically meaningless, confusing, medically unjustified, and
contraindicated, causing cruel and harmful stress to patients.”71
Despite the limitations that courts appeared to be imposing
on the disclosures required of a doctor before performing an
abortion, the direction of informed consent took a dramatic turn
when the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.72
In Casey, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality
of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.73 Although
the Court emphasized in its decision that it was not overruling
Roe v. Wade, it did apply a different test—the undue burden
test—in determining whether the Pennsylvania statute was
constitutional.74 Specifically, the undue burden test requires a
determination of whether a “state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”75
In Casey, the following provisions of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act were being challenged: (1) the informed
consent provision that required a 24-hour waiting period prior
to an abortion;76 (2) the parental notification requirement for
minors seeking an abortion; (3) the spousal notification requirement for married women; and (4) the reporting requirements
71. Id. at 784.
72. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
73. Id. at 844 (addressing the challenge to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1982) (amended 1989)).
74. Id. at 846, 876.
75. Id. at 877.
76. Id. at 881. The 24-hour waiting period required that, except in cases of
emergencies, a physician must provide a patient with certain information at least
24 hours prior to performing an abortion. Id. (discussing the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)). This information included “the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child’” as well as notifying the woman “of the availability of printed materials published by the State
describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which
provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion.” Id. Before a woman could have an abortion she had to certify in writing that this information was
made available to her. Id.
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for facilities providing abortion services.77 In applying the undue burden test, the Court found that only the spousal notification requirement of the Act failed the test. The Court upheld
the other informed consent provisions noting that “[i]f the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is
truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”78 The standard set forth in Casey—that the information be
“truthful and not misleading”—has provided a large window of
opportunity for states to require specific disclosures by doctors
in cases of abortion.
After Casey, some states attempted to exploit the opportunity presented by the Court’s reformulated test. For example,
South Dakota passed a law requiring additional disclosures by
a doctor before a patient can give informed consent for an abortion.79 The constitutionality of South Dakota’s statute was challenged in Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds.80
Specifically, the statute required a physician “before performing
an abortion and as a precondition to informed consent, [to] advise the patient that ‘the abortion will terminate the life of a
whole, separate, unique, living human being’ and that ‘by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be
terminated.’”81 Although the outcome of these cases have varied, many states since Roe v. Wade have sought to use the doctrine of informed consent as a means of requiring a
77. Id. at 844.
78. Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
79. 2005 S.D. Sess. Laws 1166, available at 2005 SD H.B. 1166 (N.S.)
(Westlaw).
80. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 727 (8th Cir. 2006),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Jan. 9, 2007). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit originally upheld the lower court’s preliminary injunction because the majority of the panel found that the compelled disclosures
“could . . . violate both the First Amendment rights of physicians and the due process rights of women seeking [an] abortion.” Id. The Eighth Circuit, sitting en
banc, subsequently vacated and remanded the original district court opinion.
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008), vacating and
remanding on reh’g en banc, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.S.D. 2005). On remand, the
plaintiffs and defendants both filed for summary judgment. Both motions were
granted in part and denied in part. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, No. Civ.
05-4077-KES, 2009 WL 2600753 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2009).
81. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 425 (N.J. 2007) (citing S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(b), (d) (2005)).
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substantially greater level of disclosure than that required for
most medical procedures.82 While scholars and individuals may
disagree as to the “true purpose” behind these informed consent
statutes,83 what has become clear is that they can be used as a
legislative tool to try to impose a duty on doctors to disclose information that is beyond the requirements of the original doctrine of informed consent.
II. Statement of the Case: Acuna v. Turkish
In Acuna v. Turkish, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
faced with determining the scope of informed consent under
New Jersey common law. New Jersey courts employ a reasonable prudent patient standard for determining the amount of disclosure doctors must provide to their patients.84 Specifically,
the court was presented with the question of whether, “under
the common law duty to obtain informed consent, a physician is
required to advise a woman, who is in the sixth to eighth week
of pregnancy, that an abortion procedure will kill not just a potential life, but an actual existing human being.”85 The court in
this case made it clear that doctors are only required to provide
their patients seeking an abortion with material medical information.86 The court held that there is no duty for a physician to
inform a pregnant patient that an embryo is an existing, living,
human being, or that an abortion results in the killing of a life.87
The plaintiff, Rosa Acuna, filed a malpractice action against her
obstetrician-gynecologist, Dr. Sheldon Turkish,88 claiming that
he failed to provide her with information sufficient to gain her
82. Van Detta, supra note 57, at 246-47.
83. Although state informed consent laws are frequently passed with the
stated purpose of ensuring that a woman has made a decision regarding an abortion based on all information available, opponents argue that these measures are
actually designed to limit or prohibit women from exercising their right to an abortion. See id.
84. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 425. The reasonably prudent patient standard is an
objective standard that requires a doctor to disclose “what a reasonable person
would find material to the decision to undergo treatment.” Spielman, supra note
49, at 724.
85. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 424.
86. Id. at 427-28.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 418. At the time of the consultation, Dr. Turkish had been practicing medicine for more than thirty years. Id. at 419.
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consent prior to performing an abortion.89 When Ms. Acuna
first went to see Dr. Turkish she was complaining of abdominal
pains and headaches.90 At that time, she was twenty-nine years
old, married, and the mother of two daughters under the age of
three.91 After performing an ultrasound, Dr. Turkish informed
Ms. Acuna that she was approximately six to eight weeks
pregnant.92
There was some discrepancy over the conversations that
ensued after Dr. Turkish informed Ms. Acuna that she was
pregnant. First, Ms. Acuna claimed that because of a kidney
disorder she had been suffering from since high school, Dr.
Turkish told her that unless she had an abortion she would die
in three months due to kidney complications.93 Dr. Turkish denied making such a statement; however, his assistant
remembered that Ms. Acuna mentioned “ ‘she wanted to end the
pregnancy because she had two small children at home’ and
that her pregnancy was ‘too soon after the birth of her second
child.’”94 Second, Ms. Acuna recounted that she asked the doctor “if it was the baby in there” and the doctor replied, “don’t be
stupid, it’s only blood.”95 Although Dr. Turkish could not remember his exact conversation with Ms. Acuna, he believed
that if she had asked that question, he would have responded
that “ ‘a seven-week pregnancy is not a living human being’ but
rather it ‘is just tissue at this time.’ ”96
In light of Dr. Turkish’s comments and after discussing the
matter with her husband, Ms. Acuna agreed to have a termina89. Id. at 418. Ms. Acuna filed an eleven-count complaint against Dr. Turkish, his medical group, and an unidentified nurse, which was originally dated April
8, 1998. Id. at 420 n.6. The complaint consisted of wrongful death and survival
claims on behalf of her unborn child, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and lack of informed consent claims on her behalf. Id. at 420. All of the
other claims had been dismissed or addressed throughout the litigation, so that the
only claim put before the New Jersey Supreme Court was the issue of informed
consent. Id. at 423.
90. Id. at 418.
91. Id. at 419. Dr. Turkish had been her regular obstetrician-gynecologist for
five years and had also delivered Ms. Acuna’s youngest daughter. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at n.3 (internal brackets omitted).
95. Id. at 419.
96. Id.
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tion of pregnancy (“TOP”) performed.97 She signed a consent
form for the TOP that included a statement that the doctor had
“explained all of the risks and complications to [the patient].”98
That same day, a vacuum aspiration was performed to terminate the pregnancy.99 Unfortunately, Ms. Acuna suffered an
“incomplete abortion” and she was taken to the hospital a few
weeks later, where doctors performed a dilatation and curettage
procedure.100 Ms. Acuna claims that when she asked a nurse
what had happened “[t]he nurse replied that the doctor had left
parts of the baby inside of you.”101 Although the procedure did
not actually remove any fetal parts—only chorionic villi, the lining of the uterus—this statement greatly upset Ms. Acuna.102
She decided to conduct research on her own after the procedure
had been performed to determine what had happened and the
nature of her pregnancy at that point. She ultimately concluded “that the abortion procedure killed a human being.”103
As a result, she suffered from depression and was eventually
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.104
The basis of Ms. Acuna’s claim that Dr. Turkish failed to
provide her with information sufficient to obtain her consent
prior to performing an abortion centered around his statement
that there was no human being present at the time of the procedure, but rather blood or tissue. She argued that in order to
make an informed decision to consent to the procedure, she
needed to know whether the embryo was an existing human being.105 A key factor in her decision-making was whether she
would be “prevent[ing] a human being from coming into exis-

97. Id. Ms. Acuna returned to the doctor’s office three days later to have the
TOP performed. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. “A vacuum aspiration is a procedure in which the physician vacuums
out the embryonic tissue.” Id. at n.4.
100. Id. at 419. The termination of pregnancy was performed on approximately April 9, 1996 and the dilatation and curettage was performed on approximately May 4, 1996. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at n.5.
103. Id. at 420.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 423.
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tence, [or] . . . terminat[ing] [the] life of an existing living
human being.”106
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that there is no duty
for a physician to inform a pregnant patient that an embryo is
an existing, living human being or that an abortion results in
the killing of an existing human being.107 In arriving at its decision, the court acknowledged that there was no 1) medical basis,
2) public policy rationale, or 3) legal basis to require a doctor to
disclose such information.108 New Jersey law is well settled. “A
physician has a legal duty to disclose to the patient all medical
information that a reasonably prudent patient would find material before deciding whether to undergo a medical procedure.”109
The key in this area of disclosure is “medical information.” The
court found that the disclosure Ms. Acuna sought—that an embryo is an existing, living, human being—was not within the
category of medical information; rather, it was more akin to a
theological, philosophical, or personal opinion. On this point,
the court noted that both Ms. Acuna and Dr. Turkish would be
able to have experts testify and both would reach different results as to when life begins.110 In its decision, the court reaffirmed that this is not an area of medical certainty.111
Additionally, the court found no public policy reason that
required doctors to make such a disclosure. The court specifically acknowledged the lack of public consensus surrounding
the very disclosure Ms. Acuna was seeking to require a doctor to
make:
On the profound issue of when life begins, this
Court cannot drive public policy in one particular direction by the engine of the common law when the opposing sides, which represent so many of our citizens,
are arrayed along a deep societal and philosophical divide. We are not unmindful of the raging debate that
has roiled the nation and of the sincerely and passion106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 424-28.
Id. at 426.
Id.
Id.
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ately held beliefs by those on opposite sides of the
debate.112

The discord on this issue—among not only New Jersey citizens, but among citizens nationwide—was a significant factor
in the court’s decision not to impose a duty on doctors to disclose
that “an abortion procedure will kill not just a potential life but
an actual existing human being.”113 In addition, the defendants
argued that compelling a doctor to disclose information that “is
not a biological fact, but a moral, theological, and highly personal judgment” would violate the doctor’s First Amendment
right to free speech.114 Although the court did not need to ultimately decide the constitutional argument raised by the defendants in this case,115 it did acknowledge that a doctor’s right to
free speech may become an issue under other facts.116 Moreover, the court stressed that “[u]nder the doctrine of informed
consent, the knowledge that [Ms. Acuna] sought from [Dr. Turk112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 427.
Id. at 424, 428.
Id. at 424.
See id. at 426-27. The court noted,

[w]e need not reach the constitutional arguments raised by defendants and
amici who claim that it is . . . a violation of a physician’s First Amendment
free speech right to compel a physician to advise a pregnant woman that an
embryo is an existing human being and that an abortion is tantamount to
killing a child. We do not resolve those arguments because we cannot find
that New Jersey’s common law imposes a legal duty on a physician to give
[these] instructions.
Id. at 427.
116. Id. at 426. In its opinion, the court cites to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern, Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-76 (1992), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977), for the proposition that doctors may have a right to
be free from government-compelled speech. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 426. The court
also commented on the current litigation over a South Dakota informed consent
statute in the case of Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 719
(8th Cir. 2006), which required a physician “before performing an abortion and as
a precondition to informed consent, [to] advise the patient that ‘the abortion will
terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being’ and that ‘by
having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights
with regards to that relationship will be terminated.’” Acuna, 930 A.2d at 427
(citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(b), (d) (2005)). The court in Acuna
remarked that “[c]learly, the compelled disclosure required by the South Dakota
Legislature is pushing the doctrine of informed consent to the edge of a new constitutional fault line.” Id. (citing Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939,
956-60 (2007)).
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ish] cannot be compelled from a doctor who may have a different
scientific, moral, or philosophical viewpoint on the issue of
when life begins.”117 Ultimately, the court was unwilling to impose a duty on a doctor to disclose such views that society itself
has been unable to reconcile.118
Finally, the court reasoned that there is no legal duty for a
doctor to disclose to a pregnant woman that an embryo is an
existing, living, human being.119 First of all, it is not the practice of other medical practitioners in New Jersey or elsewhere to
disclose such information.120 In addition, there is presently no
applicable state or federal law that imposes such a duty on a
doctor.121 Moreover, Ms. Acuna failed to identify any jurisdiction or court that has imposed such a common law duty upon a
doctor.122 As a result, the court held that under the common
law doctrine of informed consent, doctors are required to “provide their pregnant patients seeking an abortion only with material medical information, including gestational stage and
medical risks involved in the procedure.”123
III. Analysis: Finding the Middle Ground
The courts decision in Acuna provides guidance as to the
level of disclosure a doctor in the digital age must provide to
satisfy the requirements under the doctrine of informed consent. The approach in Acuna—requiring a doctor to disclose
only material medical information—provides a middle ground
between the minimal disclosures doctors have used for some
medical treatments and the excessive disclosures being sought
by some states.124 This approach is effective because it advances the principles behind the doctrine of informed consent,
117. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 428.
118. See id. at 427.
119. Id. at 428.
120. Id. at 426.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 428.
124. See National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League: ProChoice America, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-action-center/in_your_
state/who-decides/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2009), for a searchable database of abortion laws by state.
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while at the same time taking into consideration the evolution
of the reasonable patient into that of the informed consumer.
There are primarily three public policy reasons for requiring a doctor to obtain a patient’s informed consent:
First, physicians have knowledge and experience
beyond that of the average patient, putting them in a
position to provide information about disease
processes, risks, and benefits of potential treatments,
and prognoses. Second, the personal and intimate nature of the doctor-patient relationship invites the patient to rely on the advice and expertise of the
physician. Third, the idea that physicians owe a duty
of care is already established in tort law, such that
failure to obtain a patient’s informed consent breaches
that duty and gives rise to a claim of negligence. The
underlying public policy is to ensure that patients
have sufficient facts for making health care
decisions.125

The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Acuna
advances all three of these policy reasons by striking the proper
balance between requiring doctors to provide their patients
with information necessary to make their own decisions regarding medical treatment, while at the same time recognizing that
the “reasonable patient” has evolved into an “informed
consumer.”
The first policy reason takes into consideration that a doctor has “knowledge and experience beyond that of the average
patient,” which is necessary to assist patients in making an informed decision about their medical treatment.126 Today, with
the advent of the Internet and direct-to-consumer advertising,
the reasonable patient has evolved into an informed consumer.127 Yet, despite the success in breaking down the barriers that once prevented consumers from accessing medical
information, “[k]nowledge and information are not synony125. McKenzie, supra note 7, at 272 (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the Patient: Shifts in Attitudes About
Consent, Genetic Information, and Commercialization in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 137, 175 (2005) (“[T]he notion of the ‘informed patient’ merges with the
notion of the ‘informed consumer.’”) The author specifically notes that “[p]atients
have begun to see themselves as consumers.” Id.
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mous.”128 It remains necessary for the doctor to serve as a
sounding board to reaffirm the medical risks and benefits associated with a particular treatment. Approximately 80% of
American Internet users, or some 113 million adults, have used
the Internet to find health information; however, only 15% of
those individuals bother to check the source and date of the
health related information they access online.129 Statistics such
as these illustrate that despite a patient’s ability to access medical information, they are not necessarily obtaining information
that is reliable, accurate, or even current. Rather, this suggests
that just as during the early twentieth century, the doctor is
still the expert—the ability to access information might have
evolved, but the doctor’s role remains the same. With the advent of websites such as WebMD,130 consumers can search for
information on a myriad of health topics, as well as research the
side effects, precautions, and interactions of various pharmaceutical drugs.131 There are also interactive features available
on WebMD’s website, such as the “symptom checker,” which enables consumers to diagnose their symptoms, and the “questions for your doctor” link, which provides consumers with a list
of prepared questions for them to use as a guide when discussing various medical conditions with their doctors.132 These websites provide consumers with access to medical information that
was previously inaccessible to the general public.133
Additionally, the advent of direct-to-consumer advertising
has been very influential in converting “patients” into “consumers.” As a result of the Food and Drug Administration’s decision
in 1998 to allow drug companies to run ads on television and in
magazines, pharmaceutical companies have increasingly used
advertising to target patients through multiple mediums—such
128. Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion
of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 376 (2002).
129. Susannah Fox, Online Health Search 2006, http://www.pewinternet.org/
Reports/2006/Online-Health-Search-2006.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, 2009). See
also Michael A. McCann, Message Deleted? Resolving Physician-Patient E-Mail
Through Contract Law, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 104, 115 (2003) (noting that in 2001,
98 million Americans searched the Internet for health information).
130. WebMD Homepage, http://www.webmd.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
131. See generally id.
132. Id.
133. Noah, supra note 128, at 433.
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as in print, on television, and through the Internet.134 A recent
study shows that the United States pharmaceutical industry
spent almost twice as much on advertising than it did on research and development in 2004.135 In addition, in 2006, the
total spending for drug advertising rose to $4.7 billion, an increase of 14.1%.136 Today, practically every major pharmaceutical manufacturer has either a general company website or a
specific product website for consumers to obtain information
about products and even diagnose their symptoms.137
The availability of this information is a great resource for
consumers, but it does not serve as a substitute for the doctorpatient relationship. First of all, the information available to
patients is frequently incomplete or inaccurate,138 especially
given the fact that advertisements by pharmaceutical companies, “by virtue of [their] nature as . . . marketing tool[s],
pitch[ ] one treatment to the exclusion of others.”139 A key component of informed consent is the disclosure of alternative treatments. Direct-to-consumer marketing does not provide
consumers with the same information, such as treatment options, that would be disclosed by a physician. Moreover, many
consumers lack the expertise to understand much of the medical information they are downloading or reading about in a
magazine.140 As such, it is necessary for them to discuss their
findings with their doctors to ensure that the information they
134. Id.
135. Sciencedaily.com, Big Pharma Spends More on Advertising than Research and Development, Study Finds (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/01/080105140107.htm.
136. Jim Edwards, Special Report: Prescription Drugs, ADWEEK, April 30,
2007, available at http://www.adweek.com/aw/esearch/article_display.jsp?vnu_
content_id=1003577966.
137. See, e.g., Bayer Homepage, http://www.bayer.com (last visited Mar. 29,
2009); Claritin Homepage, http://www.claritin.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2009);
Johnson & Johnson Homepage, http://www.jnj.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2009);
Merck Homepage, http://www.merck.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2009); Prevacid
Homepage, http://www.prevacid.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2009); Wyeth
Homepage, http://www.wyeth.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
138. Noah, supra note 128, at 433.
139. See W. John Thomas, Direct-To-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising:
Catalyst for a Change in the Therapeutic Model in Psychotherapy?, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 209, 235 (1999).
140. Noah, supra note 128, at 433-34.
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have obtained is truthful and not misleading.141 Ultimately,
“[p]hysicians are thought to be in a better position to convey
information to patients and to quantify the risks involved with
certain medication.”142 Although information on certain websites can arguably guide consumers in asking their doctors the
“right questions” when deciding on a course of treatment, they
should not be the sole resource relied on by a patient.143
It is this expansion of the general populace’s access to information that necessitates that the information provided by a
doctor be limited to only material medical information. A patient can easily be misled by the plethora of information readily
available at their fingertips—such as news articles, pharmaceutical studies, and Internet postings—while trying to make a decision regarding any medical treatment, not just an abortion.
In fact, in Acuna, it was only after Ms. Acuna conducted her
own research that she reached the conclusion that her abortion
caused the termination of an existing, living, human being.144
Ms. Acuna had every right to consult with her family, community, or spiritual advisors in order to make a decision regarding
her abortion in light of the medical information, her religious
beliefs, and her moral and ethical values. The role of her doctor
in the decision-making process, however, should be limited to
the disclosure of material medical information.
The disclosures proposed in Acuna also advance the second
policy reason: the “intimate nature of the doctor-patient relationship.”145 The underlying principle behind the doctrine of informed consent is that a patient has a right to selfdetermination.146 “The doctrine has evolved to reflect strong judicial deference for individual autonomy—that is, the belief
that an individual has the right to be free from non-consensual
141. See Jack B. Harrison & Mina J. Jerrerson, Some Accurate Information is
Better than No Information at All: Arguments Against an Exception to the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine Based on Direct-To-Consumer Advertising, 78 OR. L. REV.
605, 615 (1999) (“Both judges and scholars alike are quick to point out that given
the abundance of consumer advertising, patients are the ones who initiate the prescription of certain well-advertised drugs.”).
142. Id. at 620.
143. Thomas, supra note 139, at 234.
144. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 419-20 (N.J. 2007).
145. McKenzie, supra note 7, at 272.
146. Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not to
Inform?, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 543, 545 (1997).
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interference with his or her person.”147 “In the medical context,
the concept of autonomy translates into an understanding that
the individual has an unfettered right to choose the course of
medical treatment, including the right not to pursue treatment
and to desist from any treatment where such medical protocol
has already been initiated.”148 An important component of patient autonomy is for the patient to reach a decision that is free
from coercion.149 In considering the influence that a doctor can
exert over a patient, it is very important for a doctor’s disclosures to be free from his or her own personal views and to reflect an objective medical standard. The court’s decision in
Acuna advances a patient’s right to autonomy by limiting a doctor’s disclosures to only material medical information.150 This
requirement is a double-edge sword—it not only limits what a
doctor is required to disclose, but it also prevents a doctor from
disclosing his own “moral, theological, or philosophical”
views.151 A patient’s decision to undergo any medical treatment
should be based on the information she deems important in rendering a decision. This decision should not be influenced by
what a particular doctor personally believes. Conversely, a doctor should not be required to disclose information that is not in
accordance with his or her own moral or religious beliefs just
because the belief is held by that particular patient.152 To avoid
such dangers, it is necessary for a doctor’s disclosures to be limited to only material medical information; the disclosures
should not encompass information that is based on moral or religious beliefs. This will ensure that a patient is not coerced
into a decision that reflects the moral and religious views of the
doctor, rather than the patient. The third policy reason acknowledges the tort remedies available to a patient in the event
a doctor breaches his or her duty to obtain informed consent.153
147. Id. at 545.
148. Id. at 546.
149. Id. at 545-46.
150. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 427-28 (N.J. 2007).
151. See id.
152. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient
Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201,
256 (1994); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 956-57 (2007).
153. McKenzie, supra note 7, at 272.
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Because doctors are ultimately liable for their failure to obtain
informed consent, it is important to set forth guidelines that delineate what the law does, and does not, require a doctor to disclose. The New Jersey Supreme Court succeeded in providing
basic guidelines for doctors by employing both an objective “reasonably prudent patient” standard and by limiting the nature of
disclosures to only material medical information.154
Although New Jersey employs a reasonable patient standard for evaluating the required level of informed consent, the
court reaffirmed in Acuna that this is an objective standard,
which focuses on what a “reasonable patient needs to know.”155
It does not require a doctor to make disclosures based on what a
particular patient may “need to know.”156 In her complaint, Ms.
Acuna was arguably asking the court to employ a subjective
standard. Ms. Acuna repeatedly stated that “to make an informed decision whether to terminate her pregnancy, she
needed to know that her embryo was even at that point an existing human being.”157 For a court to impose liability on a doctor based on what any particular patient may “need to know” to
make a decision to have an abortion would require a doctor to go
well beyond disclosure of medical information and delve into areas of moral, philosophical, and religious concern. As in the
present case, where Ms. Acuna failed to clearly voice her concerns to her doctor as to whether an embryo is a life, most doctors will not be privy to what non-medical information each of
their patients deem important in rendering a decision regarding
medical treatment. To impose liability on a doctor based on
what each individual patient would find significant to make an
informed decision would expose doctors to tremendous liability.
Furthermore, in light of the liability a doctor is exposed to for
failing to obtain informed consent, it is necessary to limit the
level of disclosure to only material medical information. Just as
is the case with patients, doctors also suffer from information
overload.158 Doctors struggle to keep up with the volume of
154. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 425, 428.
155. Id. at 425.
156. See id. at 427-28 (“[T]he knowledge that plaintiff sought from defendant
cannot be compelled from a doctor who may have a different scientific, moral, or
philosophical viewpoint on the issue of when life begins.”).
157. Id. at 423.
158. Noah, supra note 128, at 402-03.
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medical information produced, even with the assistance of electronic databases that offer search engines and summaries of articles.159 In 2002, there were “more than 25,000 biomedical
journals worldwide [that] publish[ed] more than two million articles annually.”160 Although many doctors view the Internet as
an effective method of finding information that can significantly
reduce their research time,161 “the pace of knowledge production
and acquisition presents significant challenges for the medical
profession.”162 Doctors have both “ethical and legal obligations
to stay abreast of the latest research in their fields.”163 This requires doctors to do more than just access information; they
must actually take the time to comprehend it. In light of the
burden doctors already carry in staying apprised of recent medical developments it would be impractical to extend this burden
to non-medical information.
IV. Conclusion
In the twenty-first century, the traditional “reasonable patient” has evolved into a techno-savvy, web-surfing consumer
who seeks out and is bombarded by medical information from
all available sources. But despite this change in the reasonable
patient, there still exists a great need for doctors to play a prominent role in educating patients about their treatments prior to
obtaining consent. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in
Acuna v. Turkish not only balances a patient’s need for information in order to make an educated decision regarding treatment,
but also reflects the limited role a doctor should play in that
process—to provide only material medical information. The
Acuna court recognized the changing face of today’s patients
and the need to limit a doctor’s disclosures in order to ensure
that patients are not misled by the wealth of information available to the average person. Although the court’s decision was
made in the context of an abortion case, the reasoning behind
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 402.
McCann, supra note 129, at 115.
Noah, supra note 128, at 404.
Id.
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its decision and its recognition that the role of the patient has
evolved can be applied to the doctrine of informed consent for all
medical treatments.
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